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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the 1970’s, recessions have become more frequent and severe, causing major 
changes to the labor market and the importance of education. This study focuses on the 
problems for employees with master’s degrees and MBAs, and asks three questions: 1) 
Do employees with graduate degrees have higher earnings than bachelor’s degree 
recipients, 2) Do they experience greater job security as a result of their additional 
education, and 3) Is graduate school a way to avoid unemployment during a recession? 
Ordinal logistic regression analysis is conducted and finds that master’s degrees and 
MBAs experience very different outcomes, with much higher returns for MBAs although 
master’s degrees do see higher earnings than bachelor’s degrees. Job security is slightly 
higher for the graduate degrees relative to bachelor’s degrees, which could account for 
the relatively higher earnings. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, the returns to college and graduate school 
have received mounting attention due to endlessly growing tuition rates, student debt 
levels and unemployment. Major news sources including the New York Times1, National 
Public Radio2, and the Economist3 have opined about the worthiness of all levels of 
higher education. Historically, economists have given substantial attention to the returns 
to education, from high school through professional and doctoral degrees, although most 
literature focuses on returns to high school or undergraduate degrees. The consensus from 
this research is that undergraduate education is in fact worth the time and expense, as 
each additional year increases lifetime earnings and decreases the likelihood of 
                                                 
1
 Cost of college: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/education/03college.html?scp=15&sq=higher+ 
education&st=nyt ; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/education/12college.html?_r=1&scp=18&sq= 
higher%20education&st=cse; Master’s degrees http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/what-
is-a-masters-degree-worth/?scp=37&sq=higher+education&st=nyt; PhDs 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/thinking-of-going-to-grad-school/, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/education/edlife/18phd-t.html?scp=17&sq=higher+education&st=nyt 
 
2
 Cost of college: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112432364 
 
3
 Returns to MBAs: http://www.economist.com/node/14297397; waiting out recessions: 
http://www.economist.com/node/11885366; higher education bubble: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/04/higher-education_bubble; the value of college: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/01/education_0; the value of PhDs: 
http://www.economist.com/node/17723223 should business school students worry about graduating during  
a recession: http://www.economist.com/node/11392358; 
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unemployment4 (Ashenfelter & Ham, 1979; Brewer et al., 1999; Ceci & Williams, 1997; 
Eide, Brewer & Ehrenberg, 1999). In addition to higher earnings, there may be 
supplementary benefits for certain subpopulations; for example, attending an elite 
undergraduate institution versus a lower tier private or public institution may also 
increase the probability of acceptance into a top graduate program (Eide et al., 1998).  
Signaling and human capital theories are two widely discussed theories which are 
relevant to the value of education. Human capital theory argues that schooling provides 
some skills which are necessary for the workplace, making those recipients more 
productive and thus raising their attractiveness to employers. Human capital theories tend 
to assume that the ability of employers to accurately assess potential employees’ skills is 
a trivial problem (Bills, 2003). The reason that signaling is important is because of the 
employer’s ability to “screen.” Because labor markets are often based on asymmetric 
information, applicants use their resources in order to signal those employers who screen 
(Stiglitz, 1975). Signaling and human capital theories may be closely intertwined, such 
that schooling acts as a signal but human capital actually is still acquired, augmenting 
productivity. However, another possibility is that education is only a signal for 
employers, as schooling does not actually affect a student’s skill set. Arrow (1973) 
argued that education is merely a filter, and that higher education is a double filter, 
because one must be accepted into the university and then graduate. More recently, 
                                                 
 
4
 For this study, it is irrelevant whether additional years of education merely function as a signal for ability 
or whether intelligence is actually acquired via time in school. For a discussion of the linkages among 
income, education and intelligence see Ceci and Williams (1996).  
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Albrecht and van Ours (2006) showed that when informal, more informative recruitment 
channels were used to locate potential employees, firms were more likely to lower 
educational standards implying that education does act as a signal, even if it does not 
increase human capital. If either or both of these theories do hold, then they may partially 
explain the appeal of higher education. 
There has been swift growth in the number of higher education degrees awarded 
each year, largely as a result of the number of graduate degrees awarded each year 
(National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2010a). This increase in education 
spending is part of the reason why education debt has surpassed credit card debt for the 
first time. Tuition increases and the payment of credit card debt also contributed to this 
change, but the level of education debt is potentially problematic because despite the ease 
with which a student may take out education loans, these loans are not subject to the 
same bankruptcy rules as other forms of debt, which can badly affect consumers who 
default.5 The profusion of literature regarding returns to undergraduate education may 
encourage the broad acceptance of the arguably ill-supported notion that any additional 
education is a worthwhile investment.6 Only limited research on the returns to graduate 
degrees is actually available, which may be the result of inadequate data, or the pervasive 
                                                 
5
 Please see the the Wall Stree Journal article and Federal Reserve release for additional information: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/08/09/student-loan-debt-surpasses-credit-cards/ 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/g19.htm 
 
6
 It should be noted that education may also be viewed as a consumption good, as opposed to its more 
frequent classification as an investment good. This study will not consider the utility derived from 
education as a potential benefit. For a discussion of the joint treatment of education as a production and 
consumption good, see Lazear (1977). 
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acceptance that they simply must yield greater returns. The research that does exist 
concedes that graduate degree recipients do receive greater income than those with only 
undergraduate degrees, but that the increase is relatively small (Brewer, Eide & 
Ehrenberg, 1999; Ehrenberg, 2004).  
This information invites the question of whether higher education is the next 
bubble. If returns to education are in fact relatively small, yet the market fails to 
understand this, then what will keep the education system (which relies heavily upon 
federally subsidized loans) afloat? The duet of the Great Recession and the limited 
research supporting the existence of financial gains to graduate education provides the 
motivation for this study. General master’s degrees (e.g. Master of Art) and Master of 
Business Administration (MBAs) degrees will be the focus, and will be generally referred 
to as graduate degrees. The questions that will be asked are: 1) Do graduate degrees 
increase earnings, 2) Do graduate degrees increase job security, and 3) Is graduate school 
a means to bridge a gap in employment? Empirical analysis will be conducted in order to 
answer the first question and the results will provide an avenue for discussion regarding 
the remaining questions.   
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Chapter II: Returns to Graduate Education 
Despite the broad acceptance of the idea that graduate degrees will yield higher 
returns than undergraduate degrees, the only degree with a substantial amount of 
supporting research is the MBA. Davies and Cline (2005) showed that starting salaries 
were an average of $15,000 higher for students who completed an MBA, and found that 
people with graduate degrees have experienced lower unemployment since the 1970’s. 
The result is that “getting a plain-vanilla MBA today is like receiving a tax free, cash 
award of more than a half million dollars” (Davies & Cline, 2005, p.45). Holtom and 
Inderrieden (2007) echoed these benefits, stating that the average salary increase for full 
time MBA students was approximately 59 percent; they made the additional claim that an 
MBA can nullify previous salary history, especially for people who began their 
employment during a recession7.  
Numerous research methods have been employed in an attempt to fully capture 
the value that MBA programs provide. One such technique is data envelopment analysis, 
which was employed in a number of studies (Fisher & Kiang, 2007; Haksever & 
Muragashi, 1998; Hsu, Chao, & James, 2009). While the precise categorizations and 
                                                 
7
 Holtom and Inderrieden (2007) do still note that approximately ten percent of degree recipients do not 
experience an increase in salary, although they attribute this to international students and people who 
switch careers (generally from a different well-paid profession such as engineering or medicine). 
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variables differ between studies, this literature compared MBA programs based on their 
value-added efficiency. Haksever and Muragishi (1998) found little difference between 
top 20 and lower programs, while Hsu, Chao and James (2009) found that top-ten MBA 
programs were relatively more efficient than non-top ten programs, which could reflect 
changes in the structure of these programs over the last decade or so. Survey based results 
also concluded that MBA’s were worthwhile with returns on investment of 17 to 20 
percent, regardless of school or student characteristics (Holtom & Inderrieden, 2007).  
What is interesting about these studies, however, is that they are often based on 
subjective measures, such as survey responses regarding expected earnings, and whether 
MBA student felt the costs were worth it.  
 In light of the substantial returns to business school (even if at worst they are 
somewhat imagined), it is not surprising that a quarter of the 625,000 master’s degrees 
awarded between 1998 and 2008 were concentrated in business (NCES, 2010a). The 
proportion of business degrees to the total number of degrees barely increased, as shown 
in Table 1, and no other field of study experienced a substantial shift in proportion
8
. 
However, the number of master’s degrees awarded each year has increased by 45 percent 
from 1998-2008, while associate’s and bachelor’s degrees experienced smaller respective 
increases of approximately 32 and 34 percent as shown in Table 2 (NCES, 2010a). 
Business and education degrees (28 percent) made up over half of all graduate degrees 
awarded.  
                                                 
8
 The table containing field of study information for professional and doctoral degrees can be found in 
Appendix A. Appendix B shows the degrees conferred by gender and race/ethnicity.  
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Table 1 
Graduate and First-Professional Fields of Study 
 
1997–98 
 
2007–08 
 
1997–98 to 
2007–08 
Field of study Number 
Percent 
 
Number 
Percent 
 
Change in 
number of 
degrees 
Percent 
change of total of total 
Master’s degrees 
        Total1 430,164 100 
 
625,023 100 
 
194,859 45.3 
Education 113,374 26.4 
 
175,880 28.1 
 
62,506 55.1 
Business 101,652 23.6 
 
155,637 24.9 
 
53,985 53.1 
Health professions and related 
39,567 9.2 
 
58,120 9.3 
 
18,553 46.9 clinical sciences 
Engineering and engineering 
27,327 6.4 
 
34,592 5.5 
 
7,265 26.6 technologies 
Public administration and 
social service professions 25,144 5.8 
 
33,029 5.3 
 
7,885 31.4 
Psychology 15,142 3.5 
 
21,431 3.4 
 
6,289 41.5 
Social sciences and history 14,938 3.5 
 
18,495 3 
 
3,557 23.8 
Computer and information  
11,765 2.7 
 
17,087 2.7 
 
5,322 45.2 sciences and support services 
Visual and performing arts 11,145 2.6 
 
14,164 2.3 
 
3,019 27.1 
Biological and 
biomedical sciences 6,788 1.6 
 
9,565 1.5 
 
2,777 40.9 
English language and 
literature/letters 7,587 1.8 
 
9,161 1.5 
 
1,574 20.7 
Communication and 
communications technologies 6,097 1.4 
 
7,546 1.2 
 
1,449 23.8 
Library science 4,871 1.1 
 
7,162 1.1 
 
2,291 47 
Theology and religious 
vocations 4,649 1.1 
 
6,996 1.1 
 
2,347 50.5 
Architecture and related 
services 4,347 1 
 
6,065 1 
 
1,718 39.5 
Physical sciences and science 
technologies 5,328 1.2 
 
5,899 0.9 
 
571 10.7 
Security and protective 
services 2,000 0.5 
 
5,760 0.9 
 
3,760 188 
Multi/interdisciplinary studies 3,067 0.7 
 
5,289 0.8 
 
2,222 72.4 
Mathematics and statistics 3,409 0.8 
 
4,980 0.8 
 
1,571 46.1 
Legal professions and studies 3,228 0.8   4,754 0.8   1,526 47.3 
1
 Includes other fields not shown separately.  
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Note: Adapted from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1997–98 and 
2007–08 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, “Completions Survey” (IPEDS-C:98) and Fall 
2008.  Detail may not sum to total because of rounding.  
 
Table 2 
Number of degrees conferred, percent change: Academic years 1997-98 and 2007-08 
 
Number of Degrees 
   1997–98 2007–08 Percent Change 
Associate's 558,555 750,164 34 
Bachelor's 1,184,406 1,563,069 32 
Master's 430,164 625,023 45 
First-professional 78,598 91,309 16 
Doctoral 46,010 63,712 38 
 
This is particularly important, as a recent study by the Economic Policy Institute 
found that teachers made approximately 12 percent less than their peers when controlling 
for education and experience; Table 3 depicts the weekly income differences between 
teachers and other professionals by degree level and region (The full table including 
differences by individual state can be found in Appendix C). This wage disparity has 
been relatively constant since 1999 (Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel, 2011). The 
negative yields of education degrees and the lack of research supporting possible benefits 
of other master’s degrees provides no explanation for the huge growth in degree 
conferral, thus it is particularly surprising.  
The growth in the number of master’s degrees awarded each year is even more 
puzzling considering the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (2009) employment projections that 
one-third of all positions and nearly half of all new positions are expected to require a 
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postsecondary degree by 2018, with the largest growth in jobs requiring associate’s 
degrees. Again, if job growth is not spurring demand for graduate degrees, then what 
incentive exists to explain the 45 percent growth in master’s degrees? The discrepancies 
between the documented effects of all fields of graduate education on lifetime earnings, 
expected job growth, and the number of graduate degrees awarded led to the first 
question in this study: Do either master’s degrees or MBAs9 actually yield higher returns 
than bachelor’s degrees?  
  
                                                 
9
 Professional degrees (such as law degrees and medical degrees) and doctoral degrees will not be included 
in this study. The length of schooling differs tremendously from master’s degrees and MBAs, and the 
career options for those degrees tend to be much more specific.  
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Table 3 
Public school teacher and college graduate weekly wages, by state 
 
Average weekly wages (2006-2010 average) 
in $2010 Ratios 
Ratios 
 
Public Teachers 
Other College 
Graduates 
Average weekly 
wages teacher/other 
college graduates Share of 
Teachers 
with BA 
only  Region¹ 
BA 
level 
MA 
level Total* 
BA 
level 
MA 
level Total* 
BA 
level 
MA 
level Total* 
United States 904 1165 1034 1202 1495 1348 75.2 77.9 76.7 50.4 
New England  981 1195 1110 1209 1476 1365 81.8 81.2 81.7 42.8 
Middle Atlantic  1063 1331 1254 1290 1566 1460 82.0 85.0 85.8 38.5 
East North 
Central  
873 1206 1073 1152 1410 1306 76.0 85.6 82.3 40.4 
West North 
Central  
778 1002 873 1026 1241 1118 76.2 81.1 78.5 58.1 
South Atlantic  875 1089 987 1159 1411 1287 75.7 77.7 76.9 48.8 
East South 
Central  
775 937 864 1055 1266 1158 73.6 74.2 74.6 47.9 
West South 
Central  
787 910 822 1105 1310 1157 71.5 70.1 71.3 72.7 
Mountain  830 1023 917 1091 1340 1207 76.8 77.6 77.0 54.5 
Pacific  1021 1139 1077 1211 1504 1365 84.5 75.7 79.0 46.8 
¹Region is based on the GSS classifications which are shown in Appendix C. The average of each column 
was computed based on individual state responses.  
*Totals are weighted averages of the BA and MA level weekly wages where the weights are the shares of 
teachers with a bachelor’s degree (BA) or master’s degree (MA). This insures that the distribution of 
education among teachers and other college graduates does not affect the comparison. 
Source: Adapted from Allegretto, S. A., Corcoran, S. P., & Mishel, L. (2011). The Teaching Penalty: An 
update through 2010. Economic Policy Institute.  Issue Brief 298. Retrieved from http://epi.3cdn.net/ 
91c523e88aaf7494e2 _ vem6ibvjn.pdf 
 
Business Cycles and Lifetime Earnings 
In order to answer the first question, it is helpful to understand some of the ways 
business cycle fluctuations affect earnings. This is crucial because in addition to 
increasing unemployment, recessions affect wages such that beginning employment 
during a recessionary period will negatively affect earnings compared to equally qualified 
11 
 
candidates who begin employment during favorable economic conditions. One study 
found that Canadian college graduates who enter the labor market during a recession 
experienced severe initial earnings losses which took an average of ten years to fade; 
however, lower skilled workers may experience permanent earnings losses (Oreopoulos, 
Von Wachter, & Heisz, 2008). Genda, Kondo, and Ohta (2010) found similar results for 
more-educated (college education and above) American men, yet only a temporary effect 
for less-educated men.  
There are a number of reasons why this may occur, which were summarized by 
Oyer (2006) and included on-the-job skill development, evolving tastes based on 
environment, or the importance of “signaling,” which are all affected by recessions10. 
This is thought to be true for all levels of education. If the experience for graduate degree 
recipients mimics that of graduating with an undergraduate degree during a recessionary 
period, initial returns (if not lifetime returns) could be considerably lower due to 
difficulty finding employment and reduced earnings for those who do become employed 
(Genda, Kondo, & Ohta, 2010; Oreopoulos, Von Wachter, & Heisz, 2008; Oyer, 2006).  
In addition to the potential costs on lifetime earnings of graduating during a 
recession, a recession may increase the likelihood of unemployment. Ashenfelter and 
Ham (1976) and Keifer (1985) argued that education increased wage earnings via a 
decrease in the number of hours spent unemployed. This assumes that people with 
additional education experience lower unemployment rates, so that earnings increase 
                                                 
10
 Oyer (2006) also argued that productivity as well as earnings were affected, and showed that initial 
placement for Ph.D. economists ultimately predicted some level of professional productivity. 
12 
 
solely because they maintain employment, as opposed to receiving a higher salary 
(although they do not have to be mutually exclusive). Nonetheless, the labor market has 
changed significantly in the decades since this research as a result of the evolution of the 
disposition of business cycles (which will be discussed in more detail in the fourth 
section), and neither study looks specifically at graduate education.  
Although the value of MBAs was often researched and praised prior to the 2007 
recession, the effects of the 2007 financial meltdown on returns to MBAs (or any 
master’s degree) and the impact of graduating during a recession have yet to be 
reassessed. This is the secondary motivation for the first question in this study, as this 
literature implies either graduating in a recession or becoming unemployed will decrease 
earnings. The severity and duration of the most recent downturn relative to previous 
recessions, as shown in Figure 1, implies a higher likelihood of negative income effects. 
If, as a result of business cycle fluctuations, earnings for graduate degree recipients are 
not in fact higher than earnings for college graduates, then what incentives exist to 
explain the previously discussed growth in graduate degree conferral?  
13 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010b). Sizing up the 2007–09 recession: 
comparing two key labor market indicators with earlier downturns. Issues in Labor Statistics. December. 
Summary 10-08. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/summary_10_11/sizing_up_recession.htm 
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Chapter III: Job Security 
One possible explanation for the excessive demand for graduate degrees is the 
expectation that higher education provides additional job security. Multiple studies 
(DeCuyper & DeWitte, 2007; Probst & Lawler, 2006; Staufenbiel & König, 2010) 
considered the problems associated with a lack of job security, including decreased job 
satisfaction, a greater incidence of physical health conditions and psychological distress, 
diminished job performance11, and reduced involvement and how these issues affect 
different types of workers (e.g., permanent workers versus temporary workers, 
collectivist versus individualistic) differently. If earnings do not increase with an 
advanced degree, might these benefits be substantial enough to encourage the 45 percent 
growth in master’s degrees? Thus, the second question in this study: does having a 
master’s degree or an MBA increase job security, especially if the degree was acquired 
prior to a recession? 
Researchers analyzed the evolution of job security since the 1970’s with robust 
findings of a decrease in job security, especially for white-collar employees (Fullerton & 
Wallace, 2007; Schmidt, 1999; Valletta, 1999). Although many of the studies discussed 
control for education level, research that explicitly considers graduate education as a 
                                                 
11
 In some cases the diminished security may induce additional effort as a means of self-preservation, but 
these positive effects are still overshadowed by the negative effects. 
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method to increase job security is not available at the present time. If yields to master’s 
degrees are only slightly higher than those of bachelor’s degrees, the effect of job 
security could be an especially significant consideration in the decision to obtain a 
graduate degree and help to explain their otherwise perplexing appeal.  
The research on job insecurity which was caused by business cycle fluctuations 
considered the changing nature of the U.S. labor market. Valletta (1999) explained the 
economic implications of declining job security with respect to implicit employment 
contracts for men and skilled white-collar female workers12. He argued that a decrease in 
job security implied a change in the implicit contract when a worker who (reasonably) 
had no expectation of being dismissed (based on the firm’s past behavior) does in fact get 
let go. Because the implicit contract chosen at the time of employment is dependent on 
the concurrent environment, a change in the environment later on may cause the contract 
to be altered.  
 Similarly, Bertola (2004) proposed an alternative to the widely accepted general-
equilibrium model
13
 for a second-best scenario involving a missing financial market, in 
which employment-protection legislation (EPL) increases welfare and production. The 
                                                 
12
  Another strand of literature analyzed gender differences in job stability. Royalty (1998) compared 
differences in job tenure – which were separated into transitions from job-to-job and job-to-unemployment 
– for men and women. She found that less educated women acted significantly differently from educated 
women, causing a divergence between genders, although her model did not account for overall changes in 
stability or the effects of business cycles. This explains why other literature including Valletta (1999) does 
not include all women in empirical work. 
 
13
 Job security garnered little attention up until recently due to the acceptance of general-equilibrium labor 
models, where risk neutral behavior and perfect insurance render job security irrelevant. While the general-
equilibrium model can explain the effects of EPL, it provides no reason for such measures to be introduced, 
as they tend to decrease efficiency (Bertola, 2004). 
16 
 
example of a missing financial market implies that the costs of firing potentially differ 
from one recession to another, which would impact the employment decisions of the 
firm. For example, if a worker is hired during a boom economy, the firm may not worry 
about training costs, etc. but if the environment changes such that the firm enters a 
recession, they may decide to forgo the costs of maintaining that relationship, altering the 
implicit contract. This is supported by Valletta’s (1999) model, which found an 
increasing probability of dismissal, especially for high tenure male and white-collar 
female workers. Although job security declined, it was still higher for white-collar 
workers than for blue-collar workers
14
 as shown in Figure 2 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
[BLS], 2001; Diebold et al., 1997; Valletta, 1999). This is also true for unemployment 
rates based on education level which have been increasing since 2007, but are slightly 
lower for master’s degrees than for bachelor’s degrees, as shown in Table 4.  
                                                 
14
 It appears that the categories “white-collar” and “blue-collar” are not used in literature past the early 
2000s, possibly because they separate workers by industry, as opposed to specific occupation or education 
level. 
17 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001) Displacement rates among blue and 
white-collar workers. The Editor’s Desk. August, 2001. Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2001/July/wk5/art04.htm 
The utilization of efficiency wages to minimize turnover is especially relevant to 
the discussion of job security because if job security decreases as a result of recession, the 
incentive to offer an efficiency wage disintegrates, just as the incentive to maintain an 
implicit contract changes. Yellen (1984) claims that firms offer workers higher efficiency 
wages as an incentive for the worker to remain with that firm, even when unemployment 
rates are high as it decreases the firm’s hiring costs, in order to minimize the other 
potential costs to the firm. In contractionary periods, this may no longer be cost effective 
for the firm. For example, during a recession a firm may compare the cost of a severance 
packages versus the costs of maintaining a previously arranged employment contract, 
whether it be an implicit contract based on the original environment or a firm’s efficiency 
wage. Depending on the length of the recession and how much the firm decides to 
diminish production, it may be less expensive to continue paying the employee the 
18 
 
efficiency wage and simply wait out the contraction. However, if the recession is 
expected to be lengthy it may be less expensive to pay severance benefits and re-hire 
once the economy recovers.   
Costs to the worker including search costs, costs of employment gaps and 
physical manifestations of job insecurity are not considered. If these costs of turnover to 
the worker were considered in addition to the firm’s costs15, then the efficiency wage 
might be lower because there is a mutual benefit to both parties of decreased turnover. As 
discussed in Valletta (1990), a downturn changes the environment of the implicit contract 
(or explicit contract if that was the reason to pay an efficiency wage). Relative costs to 
the firm of firing an employee shrink compared to maintaining their previously defined 
contract, because the reasons for offering the efficiency wage cease to be concerns. If the 
downturn is so severe that the firm decreases production, the firm does not need to offer 
an incentive to maximize productivity; if the downturn affects multiple firms in a similar 
fashion, the costs of hiring new, equally qualified labor once the economy improves will 
be relatively low as well. In this scenario, the costs of turnover to the employee become 
significantly higher as other firms slow hiring and/or job creation, and as the relative 
supply of labor increases with the increased level of unemployment.  
  
                                                 
15
 However, if the costs to the firm refer to the relative costs then this differentiation will not matter, 
assuming costs to the worker are lower than costs incurred by the firm. 
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Table 4 
Unemployment Rate by Educational Attainment, 2007-2010 
 
Total¹ 
Associate's 
degree  
Bachelor's 
degree 
Master's 
degree 
Professional 
degree 
Doctorate 
degree 
2010 
      
Total 199,928 18,259 38,784 15,203 3,074 2,779 
Labor Force Status 
      Employed 121,119 12,662 28,076 11,125 2,352 2,272 
Unemployed 11,903 998 1,605 475 65 33 
Not in civilian labor 
force 66,905 4,598 9,104 3,603 658 474 
Unemployment 
Rate 
8.95% 7.31% 5.41% 4.09% 2.69% 1.43% 
2009             
Total 198,285 17,838 37,635 15,118 3,206 2,614 
Labor Force Status 
     
Employed 121,526 12,602 27,503 11,233 2,581 2,044 
Unemployed 10,597 906 1,447 403 65 46 
Not in civilian labor 
force 
66,161 4,330 8,685 3,482 560 524 
Unemployment 
Rate 
8.02% 6.71% 5.00% 3.46% 2.46% 2.20% 
2008             
Total 196,305 17,182 37,559 14,765 2,991 2,472 
Labor Force Status 
      
Employed 125,843 12,650 28,420 11,364 2,432 1,916 
Unemployed 5,831 472 714 198 31 32 
Not in civilian labor 
force 
64,630 4,060 8,426 3,203 528 523 
Unemployment 
Rate 
4.43% 3.60% 2.45% 1.71% 1.26% 1.64% 
2007             
Total 194,318 16,770 36,658 13,607 3,090 2,487 
Labor Force Status 
      
Employed 125,537 12,409 27,793 10,491 2,473 2,033 
Unemployed 4,987 388 581 175 42 13 
Not in civilian labor 
force 
63,794 3,973 8,285 2,941 575 440 
Unemployment 
Rate 
3.82% 3.03% 2.05% 1.64% 1.67% 0.64% 
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Note. Adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey Data on Educational Attainment, 
Detailed Tables 2007-2009. http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html 
¹The total includes respondents who have educational attainment levels from no schooling through some 
college. The specific results are not shown in this table as they are not relevant to this research.  
 
In the wake of a severe recession the incentive for a firm to increase job security 
may not exist, which is consistent with the objective measures of the overall decline in 
job security since the 1970’s. This is troubling for the explanation of job security as an 
incentive for the demand for graduate degrees. If job security is declining for all types of 
workers, and the gap between the different categorizations only seems to be shrinking, it 
would appear that the expense of graduate school may outweigh the benefit of the slightly 
higher job security. In order to understand the motivations behind the huge growth rate in 
master’s degree conferral, it is also necessary to understand subjective measures of job 
security as it is possible that even in the face of declining job security, significantly 
different perceptions about job security (regardless of validity) could influence education 
decisions.  
Perceptions about job security 
Trends in job security perception appeared to coincide with the findings of the 
decrease in overall security. Schmidt (1999) compared workers’ feelings about security to 
actual changes in security. She found that perceptions were well matched with the results 
of the Displaced Workers Survey, although employees were overly pessimistic in the 
early 90’s. This lends itself to Valletta’s (1999) theory that the nature of implicit 
contracts are changing, thereby increasing anxiety. The well-being of those workers who 
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maintain employment may change, because perceptions of their own job security will 
likely be affected by the experience of relatives and colleagues. This is supported by 
Burgard, Brand, and House (2009) who questioned the full impact of job security 
perceptions on overall health and found that the correlation was not entirely explained by 
actual job loss or unemployment, even when controlling for variables such as socio-
demographic and job characteristics, or prior health. Whether these anxieties have been 
magnified by the current economic situation and whether such an increase in pessimism 
is warranted is not fully understood at this time. This is directly relevant to the second 
question in this study, as the greater anxiety may cause employees to value job security 
more, which would increase the utility derived from having a graduate degree if that is 
thought to improve security. 
Similar results are presented by Fullerton and Wallace (2007), which they 
attributed to the “flexible turn” caused by the shift from manufacturing to information-
based economies and the decreasing unionization of the U.S. labor force. The flexible 
turn led to a changing social contract - or implicit contract as used by Valletta (1999) – as 
companies replaced full-time benefitted employees with a contingent workforce (part-
time, temporary and sub-contracted workers) in order to achieve labor flexibility which 
caused wage stagnation and increasing income polarization. According to the authors, 
“workers productivity per hour in manufacturing increased by about 153%, but their real 
hourly compensation (wages and fringe benefits) increased by only 39% and their real 
weekly wages actually declined by 14%” while “the Gini index of income inequality 
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among households rose from .394 to .462, an increase of 17.3%” between 1970 and 2002 
(p. 203). The result was that employees felt increasingly disconnected from their 
employers due to erratic work hours  and both declining wages and fringe benefits which 
exacerbated the perception of declining job security; this disconnect also decreased the 
workers’ own feelings of loyalty to the firm. Middle-aged workers expressed the most 
concern about job loss, which could be explained by structural displacement as younger, 
more technologically savvy and less expensive workers entered the labor force.  
Overall, employees with more education generally felt more secure in their jobs 
than less educated workers, but this relationship dissipated when labor market 
vulnerability was accounted for (Elman & O’Rand, 2002, Fullerton & Wallace, 2007). 
While human capital acquisition through early education used to be sufficient to protect 
middle aged workers from job insecurity and thus the need for reentry into education, 
changing labor market conditions have fueled employees concerns which may have 
affected participation in work-related education; this implies that perceived job security  
is not actually greater for people with additional education.  
If education improves neither actual nor perceived job security then why is 
graduate education so popular, despite relatively little research supporting the alleged 
financial gains from such an investment? Elman and O’Rand (2002) pose the following 
two questions that are directly relevant to this study: “Does early education matter less in 
restructuring labor markets or does current educational participation matter more for 
purposes of reemployment and marketability?” (p. 72). The proposition by Elman and 
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O’Rand’ (2002) that current participation in education might be more important than past 
education is interesting as it suggests current participation really acts as a signal for 
ability. The implications here are that having a graduate degree prior to recessionary 
periods (which cause economic restructuring) may not actually matter as the degree 
would not necessarily increase actual or perceived job security. 
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Chapter IV: Bridging Employment Gaps through Education 
 If job security is declining, there might still be an alternative incentive that 
increases the appeal of graduate education especially during recessionary periods if 
school allows employees to avoid a bout of unemployment. This invites the third question 
in this study, regarding the possibility that obtaining a graduate degree during a recession 
might be an effective way to bridge a gap in unemployment. 
Schneer and Reitman (1990) contributed to this suggestion. The authors pondered 
the various effects of gaps in employment for MBA graduates, for absences that were 
voluntary and for personal reasons, or involuntary due to recessionary pressures. They 
found that gaps in employment negatively impact earnings, but that the effect of a gap for 
MBA graduates was more severe for men. Men and women with employment gaps 
earned approximately $17,774 and $9,094 less income per year than their continuously 
employed counterparts, which translated to income losses of about 25 percent and 15 
percent. The authors discussed the possible implications of discrimination towards men 
who do not follow traditional career paths, because gaps act as a signal for competence, 
and social acceptance of women who leave the workforce (e.g. to have children), and 
thus a lower penalty for an employment gap. However, while female employment gaps 
tended to be voluntary which is consistent with this, the majority of employment gaps for 
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men were involuntary which implies that a social aversion to non-traditional male roles 
may not be important. Instead, wages may be affected by the nature of unemployment. 
Schneer and Reitman (1990) considered this possibility, but showed that when 
controlling for the type of unemployment the gender income difference could not be fully 
explained.  
In addition, there was one job security study that reported the ostensibly 
alternative finding that job security did remain stable through the early 1990’s by 
Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1997). This may seem contradictory to the results 
discussed in the previous section, but it is the result of the decision to control for business 
cycles by adding back cyclical job terminations in order to analyze changes in systemic 
job security. This research is particularly important because it confirms that systemic job 
security is not actually increasing – it implies instead that other factors (i.e., increasing 
frequency and severity of business cycles) are causing the increased instability. The 
authors also found that job security was greater for college graduates than for high school 
graduates although tenure differed over economic periods, which was consistent with 
similar research on wage and security variability. This is especially interesting because if 
job security is only affected by recessions, then it is that much more important for 
employees to avoid unemployment during recessions. As long as an employee can 
maintain employment during a downturn, their overall job security should not be 
affected.  
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This research supports the final question in this study: Does graduate school 
attendance allow employees to bridge a potential gap in employment? Attending graduate 
school may allow an employee to avoid official unemployment regardless of whether 
higher earnings are a direct result of job security (gained by education which decreases 
the likelihood of unemployment). Students are not counted in the labor force, as they are 
not actively seeking employment, and employers seem to accept education as a valid 
reason to be out of the labor force because education is thought to increase human capital 
and signal ability; therefore, a student may be able to convince employers that they were 
not simply unemployed.  
However, the graduate degree’s effectiveness may be contingent upon the 
economic environment at graduation such that timing is a crucial factor (e.g., is the 
graduate able to bypass the entire recession, or will they graduate in a recessed economy 
which could diminish expected salary increases). As mentioned earlier, getting an MBA 
could completely void the negative income effects of having graduated during a previous 
recession (Holtom & Inderrieden, 2007). It is plausible to expect similar results for other 
degrees, although no specific research is available. Alternatively, poor timing could 
diminish or nullify any previously captured positive effects, resulting instead in difficulty 
finding employment or lower wages. It would of course be very difficult to accurately 
predict the scope of a recession, but if an employee managed to wait out a recession by 
returning to graduate school instead of being officially unemployed, this may provide an 
27 
 
incentive for the increase in master’s degrees over the last decade as shown in Table 2, 
which included the 2001 recession as well as the start of the 2007 financial crisis. 
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Chapter V: Unemployment and the 2007 Financial Crisis 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that unemployment rose by almost eight 
million from the official start of the recession in December 2007 through October 200916, 
which is the sharpest increase in the unemployment rate of any post WWII recession in 
addition to being the most pervasive. In the three quarters prior to the start of the 
recession, unemployment increased by approximately one million (BLS, 2010a). 
Unemployment at the beginning of this recession was similar to the early months of the 
1974-75 and the 1981-82 recessions, but the most recent downturn is unique in that 
unemployment continued to trend upward even after the recession ended as shown in 
Figure 1. The previous two recessions are similar in this respect, although unemployment 
grew at much more modest rates relative to the 2007 recession (BLS, 2010b). Despite 
some similarities, Figure 3, which charts the total nonfarm employment for select 
recession since 1973, clearly shows the extreme differences between this recession and 
past downturns.  
 From January 2007 through December 2009, almost seven million long-tenured17 
workers were displaced from jobs they had held for at least three years, while an 
                                                 
16
 These estimates are seasonally adjusted. 
17
 Long-tenured workers refers to employees who held the same job for at least three years. This does 
include employees who were promoted within the company.  
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additional 8.5 million short-tenured workers were displaced (BLS, 2010c). By January 
2010, only half of the long-tenured group had found employment. These results are a 
sharp contrast to the previous Displaced Workers Survey which covered January 2005 to 
December 2007, where half as many workers were terminated, but two-thirds were 
reemployed by January 2008.  It is interesting to note, however, that at the start of this 
recession, total nonfarm employment was above the historical average, as shown in 
Figure 4. Although unemployment levels are not necessarily higher than in past 
recessions, the extreme fluctuations and still high level of unemployment is troublesome. 
Figure 3 
 
Source: Goodman, C.J. and Mance, S.M. (2011). Employment loss and 2007-09 recession: an overview.  
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review. 04-11. Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/04/art1full.pdf 
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As of February 2011 the unemployment rate was approximately 8.9 percent, of 
which 43.9 percent (six million people) were long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 
weeks or more). Although this drop in the unemployment rate, down from about 9.7 
percent in February 2010, may seem like a positive development it could simply account 
for the changing number of labor force participants. The number of people marginally 
attached to the labor force (the workers who would like to work, and may have searched 
for employment over the last twelve months but not in the four weeks preceding the 
survey, and thus are not counted in the labor force) was up slightly from 2010 at 2.7 
million (BLS, 2011).  
Considering the questions posed in this study, more relevant is unemployment 
based on education level. As shown in Table 5, the unemployment rate went up for all 
levels of education throughout the 2007 recession; unemployment continued to climb 
through 2010 as well, although all postgraduate degrees have experienced lower 
unemployment rates compared to the total level of unemployment throughout the 2007 
recession. Based on these numbers, it appears that having a master’s degree (which in this 
case includes MBAs) does in fact provide some additional level of job security relative to 
lower degrees. However, as shown in Figure 5, the unemployment rate for those with 
master’s degrees is lower (by just over one percent) than the unemployment rate for 
college graduates, and has been declining which is consistent with the literature discussed 
in section two. Only those with doctorates experienced a slight drop in their 
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unemployment rate in 2010; all other degree levels have yet to see their unemployment 
rates level out.  
Figure 4 
 
Source: Goodman, C.J. and Mance, S.M. (2011). Employment loss and 2007-09 recession: an overview.  
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review. 04-11. Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/04/art1full.pdf 
 
This information makes the first question regarding returns to education much 
more important to understanding the incentives for obtaining graduate degrees. Because 
job security is only slightly higher, it would be reasonable to expect earnings for graduate 
degrees to be significantly greater than those of undergraduate degrees in order for the 
benefits of a graduate degree to outweigh the costs of tuition and time spent out of the 
labor force. If the additional earnings from the advanced degree are not much greater than 
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income for bachelor’s degree, than this minimal increase in job security is probably not a 
considerable reason to obtain a master’s degree or MBA.  
In order to determine the answer to the initial question posed, which asks whether 
employees with master’s degrees or MBAs yield higher returns than employees with only 
college degrees, empirical analysis will be conducted to determine the probability of 
being in one of ten income brackets based on education level. The results will allow for a 
discussion of the last two questions posed in this study, regarding the desirability of 
master’s and MBA degrees based on a) the possibility of increased job security and b) 
their effectiveness at bridging gaps in employment.   
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Figure 5 
 
Note. Adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey Data on Educational Attainment, 
Detailed Tables 2007-2009. 
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Table 5 
Change in unemployment rate from start of recession to post-recession peak, by sex, 
selected recessions 
Seasonally adjusted 
Recession period and 
sex 
Length 
of 
recession 
(in 
months) 
Number 
of 
months 
from 
start of 
recession 
to series 
peak 
Unem-
ployment 
rate at 
start of 
recession 
Unem-
ployment 
rate at 
end of 
recession 
Month of peak 
unemployment 
rate 
Peak 
unem-
ployment 
rate 
Change 
in unem-
ployment 
rate 
from 
start to 
peak 
Total               
Recession period               
Nov. 1973-Mar. 1975 16 18 4.8 8.6 May. 1975 9.0 4.2 
July 1981-Nov. 1982 16 17 7.2 10.8 Dec. 1982 10.8 3.6 
July 1990-Mar. 1991 8 23 5.5 6.8 Jun. 1992 7.8 2.3 
Mar. 2001-Nov. 2001 8 27 4.3 5.5 Jun. 2003 6.3 2.0 
Dec. 2007-June 2009 18 22 5.0 9.5 Oct. 2009 10.1 5.1 
Men               
Recession period¹               
Nov. 1973-Mar. 1975 16 18 4.1 7.9 May. 1975 8.4 4.3 
July 1981-Nov. 1982 16 17 6.9 11.1 Dec. 1982 11.2 4.3 
July 1990-Mar. 1991 8 23 5.6 7.2 Jun. 1992 8.3 2.7 
Mar. 2001-Nov. 2001 8 27 4.3 5.7 Jun. 2003 6.7 2.4 
Dec. 2007-June 2009 18 22 5.1 10.6 Oct. 2009 11.4 6.3 
Women               
Recession period¹               
Nov. 1973-Mar. 1975 16 18 6.0 9.6 May. 1975 9.8 3.8 
July 1981-Nov. 1982 16 17 7.7 10.2 Dec. 1982 10.4 2.7 
July 1990-Mar. 1991 8 24 5.4 6.3 Jun. 1992 7.3 1.9 
Mar. 2001-Nov. 2001 8 27 4.2 5.4 Jun. 2003 5.9 1.7 
Dec. 2007-June 2009 18 29 4.9 8.3 May. 2009 8.8 3.9 
¹ The dates and length of recessions are determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), generally recognized as the official arbiter of recessions in the United States.   
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (December 2010). Sizing up the 2007–09 
recession: comparing two key labor market indicators with earlier downturns. Issues in Labor Statistics. 
Summary 10-08. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/summary_10_11/sizing_up_recession.htm 
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Chapter VI: Methods 
Data 
The data used in this study is cross-sectional data from the General Social Survey 
(GSS) 
18
 for the years 2006-10. The GSS provides the requisite information on personal 
and labor force data for all years, which was acquired through surveys of thousands of 
households each year. Although the GSS has been done since the 1972, the focus of this 
paper required the use of the last three surveys as a number of relevant questions were not 
asked until recently, most notably the specific type of graduate degree held by the 
respondent.   
The GSS asks for the subjects’ income level and puts responses into income 
categories. In order to use income as the dependent variable, it had to be converted into 
an ordered set of deciles, and was also converted from 1986 dollars to 2010 dollars
19
. The 
final result “inc” is that the dependent variable is the respondent’s real income decile, 
measured in 2010 pre-tax dollars. The real income deciles can be found in Appendix D, 
and the income deciles broken down by degree held is shown in Appendix E. Other key 
                                                 
18
 Data and all documentation can be found at http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/. 
 
19
 This conversion is based on Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation estimates and is purely for aesthetic 
purposes in order to allow for a more straightforward interpretation of the results. 
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variables for the analysis include the specific graduate degree obtained, whether the 
respondent has experienced a gap in employment in the past ten years (to which almost a 
third of respondents answered yes), and whether the respondent majored in education. 
The total number of observations, the mean and the standard deviation for each variable 
can be found in Table 6. Missing variables were omitted from the analysis, resulting in a 
final sample of 511 despite the relatively large number of observations for each variable. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
inc 32223 5.6840 2.8501 1 10 
age 54890 45.6084 17.4579 18 89 
hrs1 31852 41.2936 14.1210 0 89 
male 55087 0.4404 0.4964 0 1 
white 55087 0.8146 0.3886 0 1 
gap 34170 0.3076 0.4615 0 1 
college 1560 2.2250 1.2653 1 8 
teacher 1654 0.1052 0.3069 0 1 
 
The college variable is the most important independent variable in this study, 
which is a categorical variable with the following degree categories: a) associate’s, b) 
bachelor’s, c) master’s, d) MBA, e) law and medical doctorate degrees, f) doctorate (i.e. 
Ph.D, Ed.D), and g) other degrees
20
. The GSS did not ask participants to specify which 
type of graduate degree they earned until 2006; prior to this the only question asked was 
                                                 
20
 The original degree categories separated law and medical degrees. However, they have been combined 
because of their extremely small sample sizes, because empty or small cells may destabilize the model. The 
grouping of PhDs and the “other” category was also considered, but this caused substantial changes to the 
coefficients of the remaining degrees.  
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about degree level (e.g. associate’s, bachelor’s, or graduate). There are 710 respondents 
with bachelor’s degrees and 303 respondents with master’s degrees, while the samples 
for MBAs, law degrees and medical degrees include less than 30 observations each. 
Since bachelor’s, master’s and MBAs are the only specific degrees of interest, the 
samples should be sufficient for analysis.   
The effect of job security on wages for people with graduate degrees is a 
secondary focus of this study, and a number of relevant studies used GSS data for this 
purpose. There was one job security question that asked whether job security was good 
(with ordered responses of very true, somewhat true, not too true, not at all true, etc.) The 
detail provided was insufficient to allow for its inclusion here because of missing 
responses, subjective information and the fact that it was only asked in 2006 and 2010. 
Instead, a gap variable which asked whether the respondent had ever been unemployed 
and looking for work for at least one month at any time during the past ten years is 
included because of its proposed effect of income per Schneer and Reitman (1990). 
Another important variable is the teacher variable. The logic behind this decision 
is that many public school teachers obtain master’s degrees, yet they make approximately 
twelve percent less than similarly educated peers. Since education degrees account for 
over a quarter of all master’s degree awarded, the inclusion of teachers may negatively 
impact the estimation of the master’s coefficient. Unfortunately the only variable 
available is the field of study, which separates respondents by major as opposed to 
profession. The use of the teacher indicator variable may be an imperfect proxy as it 
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excludes teachers who did not major in education, but it does provide some insight and is 
included.   
The limited timeframe of the GSS data was initially a source of concern. 
Questions regarding degree level, job security and business cycles have only become of 
interest in the last few years as the scope and severity of business cycles evolved, and as a 
result most surveys do not yet contain sufficient response levels for related questions. 
Information such as the date of degree conferral and date and length of any employment 
gaps would have been beneficial, but are not yet available. An alternative to the GSS 
dataset was the Current Population Statistics (CPS), but specific graduate degrees were 
not isolated, which rendered it unusable. The GSS is the superior dataset at this time, as it 
has a sufficient sample size and covers the 2006 through the entire 2007 recession and 
will allow adequate income analysis, some insight into the effects of unemployment and 
job security. 
Hypothesis and Goals 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legitimacy of the widely accepted idea 
that master’s degrees or MBAs guarantee higher earnings and thus justify the cost of the 
degree. In the event that higher earnings are not the motivation for acquiring a graduate 
degree, two other possible incentives are a) a higher level of job security and b) the 
ability to avoid unemployment during a recessionary period. While previous research 
generally concedes that people with bachelor’s degrees earn more than those with high 
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school or associate’s degrees, the difference in income between bachelor’s recipients and 
graduate degree recipients is not as pronounced with the exception of MBAs (Ashenfelter 
& Ham, 1979; Brewer et al., 1999; Ceci and Williams, 1997; Davies & Cline, 2005; Eide 
et al., 1999; Holtom & Inderrieden, 2007). The empirical analysis will attempt to answer 
the first question in this study, with the following hypothesis: Respondents with either 
master’s or MBA degrees will earn more income than those will bachelor’s degrees.  
Ordered Logistic Regression  
The base model is adapted from Schneer and Reitman (1990) and ordered logistic 
regression analysis is conducted to determine the impact of a graduate level degree on 
real income. Logistic regression is necessary in this study because the income variable is 
reported as a categorical variable in the GSS data as opposed to individual, continuous 
dollar amounts.  The specific model I will use is the ordered logit model
21
 which employs 
maximum likelihood estimation as opposed to ordinary least squares. The ordered logit 
model assumes that the errors have a standard logistic distribution with a mean of zero 
and variance of one. This can be depicted mathematically as: 
       
   
         
 
        
 
      
 
                                                 
21
 The ordered logit model is also known as ordered logistic regression or proportional-odds ordered logit 
model. 
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where      is the probability density function which is centered at zero, and     is the 
corresponding cumulative distribution function, which represents the probability of a 
particular outcome. Coefficients (  ) for each independent variable and cut points (  ) are 
then estimated. No constant appears because its effect is essentially absorbed into the 
various cut points. The model implies that combining adjoining categories should cause a 
loss of efficiency in estimating the regression parameters.  
To estimate the relationship between the independent variables and the ordinal 
income variable, the GSS income data was converted from 1986 U.S. dollars to 2010 
U.S. dollars and organized into ten income brackets such that the likelihood of being in 
any single bracket is approximately equal to the likelihood of being in any other income 
bracket (as shown in Appendix D). This provides the following model: 
  
                    where   ϵ {1, …, 10), 
        if        
    . 
When this model is combined with the core assumptions, it implies that 
                                      , 
where         
 
      
. 
However, the coefficients that are reported are actually logit scores:  
            
 
   
  , 
and thus cannot be interpreted in the same way as the coefficients in bi- or multivariate 
regression analysis. Instead, the logit scores and cut points will be used to calculate 
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probabilities. Specifications for each independent variable will be given, resulting in a 
probability for each income decile.  
The Model 
The key independent variable is college, which specifies the highest degree 
obtained as mentioned above. College is set up as a factor variable, which essentially 
creates a virtual dummy variable for each degree category. Because the goal is to 
compare the effects of advanced degrees to those of undergraduate degrees, the 
bachelor’s category (group 2) is omitted in models two and three; accordingly, the 
coefficients on each of the other groups signify the change from the bachelor’s degree 
group. This is extremely convenient as it allows for the comparison of the distinct effect 
on income for each advanced degree compared to the effect of a bachelor’s degree. While 
I expect all college degrees to positively affect income, I expect the effect to get 
increasingly larger. 
The control variables included are hours worked per week, age, the existence of a 
gap, gender and race. The number of hours worked per week is included to account for 
any differences between full- and part-time employees, and the respondent’s age is used 
as a proxy for experience; both are expected to have positive coefficients. Gender and 
race are set up as the indicator variables male and white; these are also expected to 
positively affect income. The gap variable was coded as an indicator variable, and the 
results should be consistent with Schneer and Reitman (1990) such that a gap in 
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employment will negatively affect income. However, this question does not differentiate 
between gaps pre or post degree attainment, which may cause the effect to be less severe 
than that reported by previous studies. Cross effects between some of these variables are 
also controlled for.  
The condition that the degree variable must be at least a bachelor’s degree is also 
included. The degree variable differs from the college variable because it combines all 
graduate degrees together and includes separate degrees which are lower than associate’s 
degrees. This condition ensures consistency between the two variables and allows for the 
comparison of any additional income resulting from a graduate level degree verses a 
bachelor’s degree. This condition results in the omission of the associate’s degree 
category.  
I opted to omit the respondent’s parent’s education levels, which I considered 
including in order to control for socioeconomic background characteristics, but felt that 
risk of multicollinearity was too high. I also considered including a region dummy 
variable, but the coefficients were neither significant nor did they impact the college 
coefficients. The results from the regressions including the region control variable can be 
found in Appendix F. 
The available field of study variable was excluded from the income analysis due 
to the limited sample size and the possibility of multicollinearity, given that students’ 
choices of majors have been found to be determined by the economic opportunities 
available based on major selection (Ehrenberg, 2004). Testing concluded that only certain 
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fields were collinear, but only seven fields had more than ten observations for 
respondents with master’s degrees. Since field of study largely dictates career 
possibilities, earnings are expected to be influenced by college major or graduate field. 
For the same reason, this omission does increase the risk of omitted variable bias, as field 
of study clearly factors into potential earnings and it is reasonable to expect that it is also 
correlated with a number of other independent variables including degree level, gender 
and age.  
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Chapter VII: Results 
 The results from the ordinal logistic regression are shown in Table 7. The three 
models analyzed against the dependent ordinal real income variable are: 
1. age hrs1 i.male i.white i.gap i.college  
2. age hrs1 i.male i.white i.gap i.college male#c.age male#c.hrs1 male#gap 
3. age hrs1 i.male i.white i.gap i.college male#c.age male#c.hrs1 male#gap if degree 
is greater than 2 
4. age hrs1 i.male i.white i.gap i.college male#c.age male#c.hrs1 male#gap teacher if 
degree is greater than 2 
The base model returns results similar to what was expected. All degree categories are 
statistically significant at the five percent level, and bachelor’s, master’s and PhD’s are 
all significant at the one percent level. Age, number of hours worked per week, male and 
gap are also significant and have coefficients with the expected signs. The exception to 
this is the coefficient of white, which is puzzling because it happens to be negative, but it 
is neither significant nor is it a focus of this study, so it will be accepted as is 
22
.  
                                                 
22
 It is possible that once degree is accounted for, race effects which are so often documented do not exist at 
the same level. That this study only encompasses data from 2006-10 could also be a factor. However, the 
ultimate cause of this is outside the realm of this study. 
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The second model controls for cross effects, which are shown in Appendix G as 
previously mentioned. The cross effects are included in the regression because they were 
highly significant when using degree instead of college, in order to avoid omitted variable 
bias. Although none of the additional controls were significant when included with the 
college variable, they were included in order to avoid potential omitted variable bias..  
The major change from the first two models to the third model is the significance 
levels for the various degrees, with master’s degrees and professional degrees no longer 
significant. This is caused by the condition that was included, requiring that the degree 
category must be greater than a bachelor’s degree, which changes the coefficients of all 
graduate degrees, and causes the significance levels to change. This condition is included 
in order to ensure consistency throughout the respondent’s survey. In addition, all degrees 
are now being compared to bachelor’s degrees instead of associate’s degrees as in the 
first two models which explains why the coefficients are drastically different from the 
first two models.  
The fourth model includes the additional dummy variable teacher, which accounts 
for respondents with education listed as their field of study. While not statistically 
significant, these results confirm that having a degree in education does negatively 
impact earnings. The coefficient on master’s increased slightly as a result. The negative 
coefficient for the teacher variable lends itself to the theory that the impact of a master’s 
degree on income would be higher if teachers were excluded from the general master’s 
category, and thus should account for at least part of the relatively small master’s 
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coefficient. The teacher variable was added because the coefficient for the master’s 
degree seemed low compared to the other graduate degrees, and previous research found 
that teachers receive lower compensation when compared to other individuals with 
similar education levels (Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel, 2011). What is odd is the 
increase in the coefficient of the professional degrees, and its statistical significance at the 
ten percent level.  The coefficient for other degrees also increases, although it does not 
become significant.  
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Table 7 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Real Income Deciles 
 
  1 2 3 4 
age ***0.03304 ***0.0287 ***0.0273 ***0.0299 
 (0.0060) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0102) 
hrs1 ***0.0576 ***0.0640 ***0.0626 ***0.0624 
 (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
male ***0.5826 0.9869 0.5543 0.838 
 (0.1409) (0.7421) (0.9162) (0.9217) 
white -0.0604 -0.0548 -0.1123 -0.08300 
 (0.1701) (0.1714) (0.2074) (0.2103) 
gap ***-0.5832 *-0.3950 -0.391 -0.384 
 (0.1510) (0.2083) (0.2528) (0.2562) 
college 
    
Bachelor's ***0.8191 ***0.8192 - - 
 (0.1649) (0.1653) - - 
Master's ***0.9619 ***0.9531 0.1535 0.1808 
 (0.2078) (0.2082) (0.1875) (0.1902) 
MBA ***3.6145 ***3.6955 **2.7602 **2.7375 
 (1.1266) (1.1356) (1.1276) (1.1288) 
Law & MD ***1.6571 ***1.5601 0.7383 *0.9552 
 (0.5283) (0.5343) (0.5244) (0.5413) 
PhD ***2.1128 ***2.0842 ***1.2981 ***1.2951 
 (0.4484) (0.4467) (0.4378) (0.4422) 
Other ***2.5448 ***2.5456 **2.1639 **2.2659 
 (0.7885) (0.7803) (0.9164) (0.9247) 
teacher 
   
-0.3354 
        (0.2464) 
Number of Obs. 698 698 515 511 
LR chi2(20) 260.19 265.25 170.19 167.18 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Log likelihood -1337.563 -1335.04 -946.629 -937.411 
Pseudo R2 0.0866 0.0904 0.0825 0.0819 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Chapter VIII: Discussion 
The idea that additional education is a method of acquiring human capital and 
signaling ability to potential employers is widely accepted. Surveys of the literature make 
statements regarding the well-documented benefits of additional education on lifetime 
earnings, yet relatively few studies have actually reanalyzed these claims in the last 
decade other than to assert the benefit of undergraduate degrees relative to a high school 
education (Ashenfelter & Ham, 1979; Ceci and Williams, 1997). Given the increasing 
occurrence and severity of recessions since the 1970’s, as well as the shift from 
manufacturing to service based economies, it is important to reassess whether these 
assumptions regarding the value of education still hold, especially considering stagnant 
real income levels and the decrease in overall job security (Fullerton and Wallace, 2007; 
Valletta, 1990).  Considering the increasing frequency of graduate degrees awarded each 
year, despite an apparent lack of demand, it is especially important to evaluate the worth 
of a master’s degree compared to an undergraduate degree (NCES, 2008; BLS, 2009). 
The first question posed in this study, which considered whether master’s degrees 
or MBAs increase earnings relative to bachelor’s degrees, returned different answers for 
the two degrees. Regarding master’s degrees, there is no statistically significant increase 
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in earnings, while the large, positive coefficient for MBAs implies a high probability of 
being in a higher income bracket.   
The coefficient on master’s degree was positive but not very large, which does not 
imply a much higher likelihood of being in a higher income bracket relative to a 
bachelor’s degree. Due to the lack of research in this area, it is not entirely surprising, nor 
is it inconsistent in any way. The teacher variable was included in the regression analysis 
in an attempt to explain why the different between the two degrees is so miniscule and 
did have a negative coefficient. There were 174 respondents who list education as their 
field of study, only 71 (23.7 percent) of whom possess a master’s degree. This may be a 
slight underestimation of the true number of subjects who actually teach considering that 
approximately 28 percent of the total number of master’s degrees awarded in 2007-08 
were education degrees, and not all teachers actually have master’s degrees specifically 
in education. The minor difference in earnings for master’s degrees compared to 
bachelor’s degrees could also be the result of predetermined career paths; certain 
undergraduate degrees might prepare an employee for a specific high paying career, 
while other more general majors might funnel into less lucrative positions or require 
advanced degrees in order to perform certain jobs (e.g., an undergraduate engineering 
degree verses a teacher who is required to complete a master’s degree). This suggests that 
it may be necessary to separate master’s degrees by field of study or profession in order 
to accurately gauge the full effects of the degree on earnings. The result is that master’s 
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degrees do not significantly increase earnings, although the full effect may have been 
diluted by the inclusion of teachers.  
On the contrary, the coefficient on MBAs suggests a statistically significant 
increase in income, despite the fact that these results encompassed the entire 2007 
recession. However, because the analysis used ordinal logistic regression, the coefficients 
as shown in the Results section are not easily interpreted. In order to more clearly 
demonstrate the meaning, the coefficients and cut points were used to evaluate the 
probability of being in each of the ten income brackets, using gender, race, and 
employment gap history; condensed results are shown in Table 8 
23
. The number of hours 
worked each week was set at 40, as this is the standard U.S. work week and had the 
greatest number of observations. Two ages were included in the analysis, in order to 
account for any changes in earnings based on experience. The most frequent age reported 
was 28, and the average age was 46; since it is plausible that at either of these ages the 
respondent would have had time to receive a graduate degree, these were the ages chosen.  
The results clearly show the high probabilities of greater earnings for people with 
MBA degrees compared to bachelor’s degrees. For both white and non-white men, the 
probability of being in one of the top three income brackets with an MBA is at least 95 
percent, even when accounting for employment gaps, compared to only 55 percent for 
bachelor’s degree recipients. For men without employment gaps, the probability of 
earning at least $46,000 increases to at least 96.5 percent. Women fare slightly worse, 
                                                 
23
 Full results for bachelor’s degrees can be found in Appendix H, with MBA results in Appendix I. 
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although the probability of being in one of the top three income brackets is at least 89 
percent; for women without employment gaps, the probability increases to at least 92 
percent. This is consistent with research by Schneer and Reitman (1990) which discussed 
the pay differences between men and women with MBAs and found that women 
consistently earn less than equally qualified men. Thesis findings are also consistent with 
their research on gap effects, as a 46-year-old with a gap has a lower probability of 
making more than $46,000 per year than a 28-year-old without an employment gap, 
regardless of degree or demographic characteristics.  
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Table 8 
Income Probabilities by Gender, Race and Employment Gap History 
 
MBA Degree 
 
Bachelor's Degree 
  White Males 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
Probability of 
income < 24k  
0.90 0.63 1.31 1.31 
 
12.27 8.90 17.03 12.54 
Probability of 
income > 46k  
91.40 93.83 87.86 87.86 
 
64.45 72.19 55.26 63.88 
Probability of 
income > 80k 
79.93 85.08 73.07 73.07 
 
20.50 26.96 14.94 20.09 
  Non-White Males 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
Probability of 
income < 24k  
0.83 0.58 1.21 0.85 
 
11.40 8.25 15.89 15.89 
Probability of 
income > 46k  
92.03 94.29 88.72 91.84 
 
66.33 73.83 57.30 57.30 
Probability of 
income > 80k 
81.23 86.10 74.67 80.84 
 
21.88 28.62 16.02 16.02 
  White Females 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
Probability of 
income < 24k  
2.05 1.44 2.98 2.10 
 
24.43 18.42 32.19 24.90 
Probability of 
income > 46k  
82.13 86.81 75.79 81.76 
 
43.96 52.89 34.82 43.34 
Probability of 
income > 80k 
63.27 71.15 53.99 62.69 
 
10.03 13.77 7.06 9.81 
  Non-White Females 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
Probability of 
income < 24k  
1.89 1.33 0.34 1.94 
 
22.93 17.21 5.28 23.38 
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Probability of 
income > 46k  
83.31 87.73 99.61 82.96 
 
46.01 54.96 93.81 45.39 
Probability of 
income > 80k 
65.18 72.82 99.30 64.60   10.81 14.78 94.28 10.57 
 
Overall, these results were surprisingly similar to the magnitude of estimated 
returns found in previous research (Davies & Cline, 2005; Fisher & Kiang, 2007; 
Haksever & Muragashi, 1998; Holtom & Inderrieden, 2007; Hsu et al., 2009). 
Considering that over half of the 22 respondents with MBA’s took the survey in 2008, it 
was expected that the high returns to MBA education would not be so significant 
considering the contagion throughout the financial industry. It is possible that MBAs had 
not yet felt the full effects of the recession, or they might simply experience higher job 
security and thus higher income. Regardless, these results do support the significant 
financial benefit of MBAs compared to bachelor’s degrees.  
The second question raised was whether graduate degrees might be desirable 
because they increase job security. Based on the MBA income results, it is possible that 
they have a higher likelihood of being in a higher income bracket solely because MBAs 
experience higher job security. As discussed earlier, more time spent employed translates 
to higher income, regardless of salary (Ashenfelter & Ham, 1979; Ceci and Williams, 
1997). On the other hand, MBAs could receive higher salaries relative to other master’s 
degrees as compensation for relatively less job security. In order to differentiate between 
these alternatives it is necessary to know when the degree was received and when any 
gaps in employment occurred, which would help distinguish the effect of the degree on 
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employment gaps. MBAs could then be compared to respondent’s with other degrees to 
determine the likelihood of having a gap in employment to help determine relative job 
security, but unfortunately this information is not available at this time.  
The master’s degrees’ low coefficient suggests that job security might in fact be 
an important consideration in the decision to get the degree. Master’s degrees do 
experience slightly greater job security as show in Table 9. However, the unemployment 
rate for master’s recipients was 4.1 percent while the unemployment rate for bachelor’s 
degree candidates was 5.4 percent in 2010, which is only slightly lower. Even so, the 
unemployment rate grew at a slower rate (approximately one percent less) for master’s 
degree recipients than it did for bachelor’s degree recipients. It is possible that MBAs 
affect these estimates, if MBAs do have lower job security than general master’s degrees 
as speculated above. This would again explain the major earnings differences between 
the two degrees, and would diminish the increase in overall job security when combined 
with general master’s degrees. If master’s degrees do have greater job security, 
employees might be willing to accept lower salaries in exchange for the benefits derived 
from higher job security. Again, without the ability to separate employment rates for 
MBAs and master’s degrees, further research must be done to differentiate between these 
possibilities, so at the current time it is difficult to tell whether this minor documented 
difference in job security is sufficient to warrant the tuition costs and time spent out of 
the labor force to obtain either an MBA or master’s degree.  
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Table 9 
Change in the Unemployment Rate from 2007 through 2010, by Educational 
Attainment 
 
Total¹ 
Associate's 
degree  
Bachelor's 
degree 
Master's² 
degree 
Professional 
degree 
Doctorate 
degree 
2007 3.82% 3.03% 2.05% 1.64% 1.67% 0.64% 
2010 8.95% 7.31% 5.41% 4.09% 2.69% 1.43% 
Change 5.13% 4.27% 3.36% 2.45% 1.02% 0.80% 
¹The total includes respondents who have educational attainment levels from no schooling through some 
college. The specific results are not shown in this table as they are not relevant to this research.  
² These numbers do not distinguish MBAs from general master’s degrees. 
Note. Adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey Data on Educational Attainment, 
Detailed Tables 2007-2009. http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html 
 
 The final question in this study asked whether attending graduate school might 
allow an employee to bridge an employment gap. While the regression analysis 
conducted here could not deal specifically with this question due to the short time-frame 
that was available, it seems like attaining a graduate degree is a promising option for 
people who would have otherwise been unemployed, but only if they manage to time 
their graduation such that it coincides with economic recovery. The MBA is more 
appealing than a master’s degree in this case, due to the high probability of returns over 
$46,000 per year. Whether a master’s degree would be just as effective is difficult to 
estimate, as the degree does not provide a significantly higher likelihood of increasing 
income, nor does it appear to provide much higher job security, although this data is 
admittedly questionable.  
 It is important to note that this study cannot be considered representative of a 
typical environment since it envelops the entire 2007 recession. As it does not provide a 
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period of comparison, it is difficult to assess whether the graduate degree’s effects on 
income are affected by the recession, or whether they are unaffected relative to a 
“normal” period of steady economic growth. However, the analysis is important as it 
provides some insight into the labor market ramifications of the 2007 recession and 
possibly some parallels to the 1990 recession. It will be interesting to see the long-term 
effects on real wages, with so many people still unemployed. Perceptions about job 
security will likely decline further, as a result of the extremely severe unemployment rate 
throughout the entire 2007 recession and the equally sluggish recovery, if it can be called 
that. This could have unseen effects on the entire higher education market, as tuition 
increases further and job security continues to decline. 
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Chapter IX: Summary 
 This study attempts to understand the correlations between graduate education 
(specifically master’s degrees and MBAs), job security, and business cycles through the 
analysis of three questions: 1) Do graduate degrees increase earnings relative to 
bachelor’s degrees, 2) Do graduate degrees increase job security, and 3) Can graduate 
school help employees avoid an employment gap? Ordinal logistic regression analysis 
concluded that the answer to the first question was yes for both degrees, although the 
increase was statistically significant at the five percent level for only the MBA. One 
possible reason why the master’s degree did not have a larger coefficient was likely the 
result of the inclusion of teachers.  
 This provided the basis for the remaining two questions. People with advanced 
degrees do experience lower unemployment compared to subjects with lower level 
degrees, but the difference between master’s degrees and bachelor’s degrees was not very 
large, which leaves two possibilities: a) graduate degrees do in fact provide greater job 
security, providing the incentive for firms to offer - and for employees to accept - lower 
salaries, which would explain why the income difference is rather small; or b) graduate 
degrees do not provide more security, but offer higher salaries as compensation for the 
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uncertainty. The outcome could be similar in either case; with the former, employees 
would still earn more over time because they maintain employment, while the latter have 
get higher salaries while they are employed, but may not actually experience higher 
lifetime earnings if they spend enough time unemployed. This study shows that general 
master’s degrees are more likely to fit the first option, while MBAs are more likely to fit 
the second option, although more information about employment gaps would be 
extremely useful to draw more concrete conclusions about the second question.  
 The final question speculates on the possibility of using graduate education to 
bridge an employment gap. Because the relationship between graduate education and job 
security is still largely unknown, it is difficult to claim with certainty that graduate school 
can in fact be utilized to avoid unemployment. However, it is likely that a well timed 
graduation may be beneficial as it allows employees to leave to temporarily exit the labor 
force while accumulating additional human capital. 
 While there are still many unsolved questions regarding job security and the 
effects of business cycles on education, this study provides the first step towards a more 
in depth understanding of the relationship between the labor market and graduate 
education. The evolution of business cycles and the changing labor market have made it 
ever more pressing to understand how additional education can affect one’s labor market 
outlook, as well as how the demand for education is affected.   
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Number of degrees conferred, percentage distribution, and percentage of degrees conferred to 
females, by type of degree and racial/ethnic group: Academic years 1997-98 and 2007-08 
Degree and 
race/ethnicity 
Number 
Percentage 
distribution 
Percent conferred to 
females 
1997–98 2007–08 1997–98 2007–08 1997–98 2007–08 
Associate's 558,555 750,164 100 100 61 62.3 
White 413,561 501,079 74 66.8 61 61.3 
Black 55,314 95,702 9.9 12.8 66.2 68.6 
Hispanic 45,876 91,274 8.2 12.2 58.3 63 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 25,196 38,843 4.5 5.2 56.5 59 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 6,246 8,849 1.1 1.2 63.9 66.1 
Nonresident alien 12,362 14,417 2.2 1.9 56.3 60.8 
Bachelor's 1,184,406 1,563,069 100 100 56.1 57.3 
White 901,344 1,222,675 76.1 71.8 55.7 56.2 
Black 98,251 152,457 8.3 9.8 64.9 65.7 
Hispanic 66,005 123,048 5.6 7.9 58.1 61.1 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 71,678 109,058 6.1 7 53.3 54.6 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 7,903 11,509 0.7 0.7 60.1 60.7 
Nonresident alien 39,225 44,322 3.3 2.8 44.9 51.1 
Master's 430,164 625,023 100 100 57.1 60.6 
White 308,196 409,312 71.6 65.5 59.2 62.1 
Black 30,155 65,062 7 10.4 68 71.8 
Hispanic 16,248 36,801 3.8 5.9 59.9 64.5 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 21,133 37,408 4.9 6 51.4 53.9 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 2,053 3,758 0.5 0.6 61.9 65.9 
Nonresident alien 52,379 72,682 12.2 11.6 39.7 42.9 
First-professional
1
 78,598 91,309 100 100 42.9 49.7 
White 59,443 65,383 75.6 71.6 40.8 47.1 
Black 5,499 6,400 7 7 58 62.7 
Hispanic 3,552 4,840 4.5 5.3 44.5 52.5 
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Asian/Pacific 
Islander 7,757 11,846 9.9 13 48.2 56.7 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 561 675 0.7 0.7 48.1 49.2 
Nonresident alien 1,786 2,165 2.3 2.4 35.7 47.8 
Doctoral
2
 46,010 63,712 100 100 42 51 
White 28,803 36,390 62.6 57.1 46.5 55.6 
Black 2,067 3,906 4.5 6.1 60.1 66.4 
Hispanic 1,275 2,279 2.8 3.6 48.9 57.1 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 2,339 3,618 5.1 5.7 40.5 55 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 186 272 0.4 0.4 55.4 57.7 
Nonresident alien 11,340 17,247 24.6 27.1 26.7 36.1 
¹ An award that requires completion of a degree program that meets all of the following criteria: (1) completion of the academic 
requirements to begin practice in the profession, (2) at least 2 years of college work before entering the degree program, and (3) a 
total of at least 6 academic years of college work to complete the degree program, including previously required college work plus 
the work required in the professional program itself. Includes degrees such as M.D., D.D.S., and law degrees. 
2 Includes Ph.D., Ed.D., and comparable degrees at the doctoral level. 
NOTE: Race categories exclude persons of Hispanic ethnicity. Nonresident aliens are shown separately since information about their 
race/ethnicity is not available. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010). Condition of Education 2010, Table A-23-
2,(NCES 2010-028). 
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Appendix B 
Graduate and First-Professional Fields of Study 
 
1997–98 
 
2007–08 
 
1997–98 to 
2007–08 
Field of study Number 
Percent 
 
Number 
Percent 
 
Change in 
number of 
degrees 
Percent 
change of total of total 
Doctoral degrees
2
 
        Total1 46,010 100 
 
63,712 100 
 
17,702 38.5 
Health professions and 
related clinical sciences 
1,975 4.3 
 
9,886 15.5 
 
7,911 400.6 
Education 6,261 13.6 
 
8,491 13.3 
 
2,230 35.6 
Engineering and 
engineering technologies 
6,038 13.1 
 
8,167 12.8 
 
2,129 35.3 
Biological and 
biomedical sciences 
5,236 11.4 
 
6,918 10.9 
 
1,682 32.1 
Psychology 4,541 9.9 
 
5,296 8.3 
 
755 16.6 
Physical sciences and 
science technologies 
4,520 9.8 
 
4,804 7.5 
 
284 6.3 
Social sciences and history 4,127 9 
 
4,059 6.4 
 
-68 -1.6 
Business 1,290 2.8 
 
2,084 3.3 
 
794 61.6 
Computer and 
information sciences and 
support services 
858 1.9 
 
1,698 2.7 
 
840 97.9 
Visual and performing arts 1,163 2.5 
 
1,453 2.3 
 
290 24.9 
Theology and religious 
vocations 
1,451 3.2 
 
1,446 2.3 
 
-5 -0.3 
Mathematics and statistics 1,215 2.6 
 
1,360 2.1 
 
145 11.9 
English language 
and literature/letters 
1,489 3.2 
 
1,262 2 
 
-227 -15.2 
Agriculture and natural 
resources 
1,290 2.8 
 
1,257 2 
 
-33 -2.6 
Multi/interdisciplinary 
studies 
843 1.8 
 
1,142 1.8 
 
299 35.5 
Foreign languages, 
literatures,  and linguistics 
1,118 2.4 
 
1,078 1.7 
 
-40 -3.6 
Public administration and 
social service professions 
499 1.1 
 
760 1.2 
 
261 52.3 
Philosophy and religious 
studies 
590 1.3 
 
635 1 
 
45 7.6 
Communication and 
communications 
technologies 
359 0.8 
 
496 0.8 
 
137 38.2 
Family and consumer 
sciences/human sciences 
386 0.8 
 
323 0.5 
 
-63 -16.3 
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First-professional 
degrees
3
         
Total
1
 78,598 100 
 
91,309 100 
 
12,711 16.2 
Law 39,331 50 
 
43,769 47.9 
 
4,438 11.3 
Medicine 15,424 19.6 
 
15,646 17.1 
 
222 1.4 
Pharmacy 3,660 4.7 
 
10,932 12 
 
7,272 198.7 
Theology 5,873 7.5 
 
5,751 6.3 
 
-122 -2.1 
Dentistry 4,032 5.1 
 
4,795 5.3 
 
763 18.9 
Osteopathic 2,110 2.7 
 
3,232 3.5 
 
1,122 53.2 
Chiropractic 3,735 4.8 
 
2,639 2.9 
 
-1,096 -29.3 
Veterinary medicine 2,193 2.8 
 
2,504 2.7 
 
311 14.2 
Optometry 1,274 1.6 
 
1,304 1.4 
 
30 2.4 
Podiatry 594 0.8  
555 0.6 
 
-39 -6.6 
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Appendix C 
Public school teacher and college graduate weekly wages, by state 
 
Average weekly wages (2006-2010) in $2010 Ratios 
Share of 
Teachers 
with BA 
only  
 
Public School 
 Teachers 
Other College  
Graduates 
Average weekly 
wages 
teacher/other 
college graduates 
State BA MA Total* BA MA Total* BA MA Total* 
United States 904 1,165 1,034 1,202 1,495 1,348 75.2 77.9 76.7 50.4 
Alabama 799 924 869 1,115 1,238 1,184 71.6 74.7 73.4 43.7 
Alaska 1,009 1,188 1,095 1,207 1,419 1,308 83.6 83.7 83.7 52.2 
Arizona 846 985 929 1,226 1,478 1,377 69.0 66.6 67.5 40.1 
Arkansas 813 960 869 1,006 1,144 1,059 80.8 83.9 82.1 62.0 
California 1,183 1,396 1,279 1,363 1,740 1,532 86.8 80.3 83.5 55.1 
Colorado 790 1,025 913 1,215 1,482 1,355 65.1 69.1 67.4 47.6 
Connecticut 1,036 1,351 1,288 1,414 1,721 1,659 73.3 78.5 77.6 20.0 
Delaware 887 1,180 1,072 1,189 1,401 1,323 74.6 84.3 81.1 36.7 
District of Columbia 992 1,216 1,133 1,275 1,654 1,513 77.8 73.5 74.9 37.2 
Florida 862 1,032 923 1,064 1,287 1,144 81.0 80.1 80.6 64.0 
Georgia 822 1,031 927 1,202 1,470 1,336 68.4 70.2 69.4 49.9 
Hawaii 905 1,026 957 1,049 1,352 1,180 86.3 75.9 81.1 56.7 
Idaho 803 926 842 1,080 1,360 1,168 74.4 68.1 72.1 68.5 
Illinois 838 1,217 1,058 1,215 1,558 1,414 69.0 78.1 74.8 41.9 
Indiana 888 1,101 1,012 1,089 1,296 1,209 81.6 85.0 83.7 41.7 
Iowa 791 1,003 865 1,034 1,225 1,101 76.5 81.8 78.6 64.9 
Kansas 732 911 804 1,051 1,310 1,156 69.6 69.5 69.6 59.7 
Kentucky 769 988 936 1,055 1,221 1,181 72.9 80.9 79.2 24.1 
Louisiana 779 863 796 1,115 1,362 1,164 69.9 63.3 68.3 80.0 
Maine 847 988 912 1,049 1,287 1,159 80.7 76.7 78.7 53.6 
Maryland 1,061 1,383 1,236 1,321 1,601 1,473 80.3 86.4 83.9 45.6 
Massachusetts 1,009 1,250 1,157 1,345 1,668 1,543 75.0 74.9 75.0 38.7 
Michigan 914 1,380 1,219 1,236 1,464 1,385 73.9 94.3 88.0 34.6 
Minnesota 896 1,153 1,048 1,177 1,457 1,343 76.1 79.1 78.0 40.9 
Mississippi 739 870 785 998 1,213 1,074 74.1 71.7 73.1 64.6 
Missouri 699 923 821 1,081 1,251 1,174 64.7 73.7 69.9 45.5 
Montana 751 984 843 875 1,020 932 85.8 96.4 90.4 60.7 
Nebraska 818 1,059 915 1,045 1,236 1,121 78.3 85.7 81.6 59.9 
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Nevada 854 1,057 972 1,121 1,418 1,293 76.2 74.5 75.1 42.0 
New Hampshire 960 1,114 1,035 1,276 1,483 1,376 75.2 75.1 75.2 51.5 
New Jersey 1,325 1,444 1,381 1,464 1,747 1,597 90.5 82.7 86.5 53.1 
New Mexico 834 1,023 928 1,093 1,452 1,271 76.3 70.5 73.0 50.4 
New York 899 1,406 1,321 1,267 1,545 1,498 71.0 91.1 88.2 16.9 
North Carolina 769 949 828 1,062 1,324 1,148 72.5 71.7 72.2 67.0 
North Dakota 781 1,003 839 894 1,078 942 87.4 93.1 89.0 74.2 
Ohio 872 1,177 1,063 1,103 1,395 1,285 79.1 84.4 82.7 37.6 
Oklahoma 685 815 721 1,072 1,215 1,111 63.9 67.1 64.9 72.3 
Oregon 1,052 972 999 1,152 1,407 1,322 91.4 69.1 75.5 33.1 
Pennsylvania 964 1,143 1,061 1,140 1,406 1,285 84.5 81.3 82.6 45.5 
Rhode Island 1,180 1,425 1,315 1,184 1,467 1,340 99.7 97.1 98.1 44.8 
South Carolina 793 912 863 995 1,092 1,052 79.7 83.5 82.0 41.3 
South Dakota 727 962 817 897 1,130 986 81.1 85.1 82.9 61.6 
Tennessee 794 966 864 1,051 1,393 1,191 75.6 69.4 72.6 59.2 
Texas 872 1,002 902 1,225 1,518 1,293 71.2 66.0 69.8 76.6 
Utah 833 1,049 907 1,117 1,371 1,204 74.6 76.5 75.3 65.7 
Vermont 855 1,040 951 983 1,229 1,111 87.0 84.6 85.6 48.0 
Virginia 892 1,127 1,008 1,291 1,692 1,488 69.1 66.6 67.7 51.0 
Washington 955 1,112 1,054 1,285 1,601 1,485 74.3 69.4 71.0 36.7 
West Virginia 800 972 892 1,028 1,177 1,107 77.8 82.6 80.5 46.9 
Wisconsin 853 1,153 1,015 1,116 1,336 1,235 76.5 86.3 82.2 46.1 
Wyoming 925 1,131 1,005 999 1,141 1,054 92.6 99.1 95.3 61.1 
*Totals are weighted averages of the BA and MA level weekly wages where the weights are the shares of 
teachers with a bachelor’s degree (BA) or master’s degree (MA). This insures that the distribution of 
education among teachers and other college graduates does not affect the comparison. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of weekly wages computed from the Current Population Survey ORG files 
averaged over the 2006-10 period and inflation adjusted to 2010. (Update of Table B-4 in The Teaching 
Penalty: Teacher Pay Losing Ground by Sylvia A. Allegretto, Sean P. Corcoran and Lawrence Mishel; 
Economic Policy Institute, 2008.) 
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Region Descriptions 
Region States 
New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
East North Central Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
West North Central Iowa,  Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
South Atlantic 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
East South Central Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee 
West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 
Pacific Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,  Washington 
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Appendix D 
Dependent Variable: Income Deciles 
Category Income Bracket Frequency Percent 
1 1-6k 2,941 9.13% 
2 6k-12k 3,019 9.37% 
3 12k-18k 2,902 9.01% 
4 18k-24k 2,811 8.72% 
5 24k-31k 3,453 10.72% 
6 31-38k 3,367 10.45% 
7 38k-46k 3,035 9.42% 
8 46k-60k 4,108 12.75% 
9 60k-80k 3,221 10% 
10 80k+ 3,366 10.45% 
Total 
 
32,223 100% 
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Appendix E 
Income by Degree level, Aged 30-50 
Income 
Bracket 
Bachelor's Master's MBA 
Law & 
MD's 
PhD's 
Other 
degree's 
Total 
1-6k 22 8 1 2 1 
 
34 
6k-12k 27 13 1 1 1 
 
43 
12k-18k 19 9 
  
2 
 
30 
18k-24k 23 4 
 
2 1 
 
30 
24k-31k 28 10 1 1 1 
 
41 
31-38k 49 12 1 
 
2 1 65 
38k-46k 28 11 
 
1 1 1 42 
46k-60k 87 42 
 
2 7 1 139 
60k-80k 70 42 
 
2 4 2 120 
80k+ 113 57 9 12 21 4 216 
Total 466 208 13 23 41 9   
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Appendix F 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results Including Region 
Dependent Variable: Real Income Deciles 
  1 2 3 4 
age ***0.0298 ***0.0265 **0.0257 ***0.0279 
 (0.0061) (0.0084) (0.0101) (0.0103) 
hrs1 ***0.0576 ***0.0637 ***0.0631 ***0.0631 
 (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
male ***0.5911 1.0289 0.6521 0.912 
 (0.1416) (0.7468) (0.9207) (0.9248) 
white -0.0154 -0.0105 -0.0167 0.02080 
 (0.1748) (0.1756) (0.2137) (0.2168) 
region 
    
Mid Atl 0.1380 0.0883 -0.0694592 -0.088 
 (0.3476) (0.3481) (0.3744) (0.3754) 
E N Cent -0.4552 -0.5004 **-.8546146 ** -.8872 
 (0.3328) (0.3340) (0.3655) (0.3683) 
W N Cent -0.2615 -0.2853 -0.1543 -0.1489 
 (0.3929) (0.3934) (0.4636) (0.4609) 
S Atl -0.3056 -0.3507 -0.2920 -0.3155 
 (0.3261) (0.3278) (0.3573) (0.3579) 
E S Cent -0.5832 -0.6633 -0.7376 -0.7346 
 (0.4404) (0.4429) (0.5044) (0.5051) 
W S Cent -0.3706 -0.4172 -0.6360 -0.6314 
 (0.3663) (0.3666) (0.4062) (0.4060) 
Mountain -0.1799 -0.2534 -0.4982 -0.4952 
 (3.6536) (0.3672) (0.4076) (0.4079) 
Pacific 0.6473 0.5661 0.4170 0.4431 
 (0.3550) (0.3576) (0.3966) (0.3938) 
gap ***-0.6264 **-0.4560 **-0.5157 **-0.5364 
 (0.1510) (0.2111) (0.2551) (0.2596) 
college 
    
Bachelor's ***0.7825 ***0.7782 - 
  (0.1663) (0.1667) - 
Master's ***0.9280 ***0.9133 0.1472 0.163 
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 (0.2109) (0.2115) (0.1887) (0.1918) 
MBA ***3.4882 ***3.5350 **2.7273 **2.7190 
 (1.1249) (1.1330) (1.1302) (1.1315) 
Law & MD ***1.6802 ***1.5902 0.8152 1.049 
 (0.5299) (0.5357) (0.5244) (0.5404) 
PhD ***2.0130 ***1.9928 ***1.2357 ***1.2238 
 (0.4412) (0.4405) (0.4378) (0.4401) 
Other ***2.4344 ***2.4249 **2.2062 **2.2959 
 (0.8072) (0.8081) (0.9377) (0.9391) 
male#c.age 
 
0.0075 0.0094 0.0070 
  
(0.0117) (0.0139) (0.0140) 
male#c.hrs1 
 
-0.0147 -0.0077 -0.0119 
  
(0.0111) (0.0134) (0.0135) 
male#gap 
 
-0.3842 -0.2181 -0.1956 
  
(0.3010) (0.3605) (0.3656) 
teacher 
   
-0.3054 
        (0.2522) 
Number of Obs. 698 698 515 511 
LR chi2(20) 286.92 289.43 192.86 190.81 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Log likelihood -1324.198 -1322.941 -935.299 -925.596 
Pseudo R2 0.0977 0.0986 0.0935 0.0934 
* Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix G 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results including cross-categorical control variables 
Dependent Variable: Real Income Deciles 
  
  1 2 3 4 
age ***0.03304 ***0.0287 ***0.0273 ***0.0299 
 (0.0060) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0102) 
hrs1 ***0.0576 ***0.0640 ***0.0626 ***0.0624 
 (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
male ***0.5826 0.9869 0.5543 0.838 
 (0.1409) (0.7421) (0.9162) (0.9217) 
white -0.0604 -0.0548 -0.1123 -0.08300 
 (0.1701) (0.1714) (0.2074) (0.2103) 
gap ***-0.5832 *-0.3950 -0.391 -0.384 
 (0.1510) (0.2083) (0.2528) (0.2562) 
college 
    
Bachelor’s ***0.8191 ***0.8192 - 
  (0.1649) (0.1653) - 
Master’s ***0.9619 ***0.9531 0.1535 0.1808 
 (0.2078) (0.2082) (0.1875) (0.1902) 
MBA ***3.6145 ***3.6955 **2.7602 **2.7375 
 (1.1266) (1.1356) (1.1276) (1.1288) 
Law & MD ***1.6571 ***1.5601 0.7383 *0.9552 
 (0.5283) (0.5343) (0.5244) (0.5413) 
PhD ***2.1128 ***2.0842 ***1.2981 ***1.2951 
 (0.4484) (0.4467) (0.4378) (0.4422) 
Other ***2.5448 ***2.5456 **2.1639 **2.2659 
 (0.7885) (0.7803) (0.9164) (0.9247) 
male#c.age 
 
0.0097 0.0113 0.0087 
  
(0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
male#c.hrs1 
 
-0.01565 -0.0065 -0.0107 
  
(0.0111) (0.0133) (0.0134) 
male#gap 
 
-0.4282 -0.2945 -0.3085 
  
(0.2975) (0.3572) (0.3622) 
teacher 
   
-0.3354 
        (0.2464) 
Number of Obs. 698 698 515 511 
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LR chi2(20) 260.19 265.25 170.19 167.18 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Log likelihood -1337.563 -1335.035 -946.629 -937.411 
Pseudo R2 0.0866 0.0904 0.0825 0.0819 
* Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix H 
Income Probabilities for Bachelor's Degrees by Gender, Race and Employment Gap 
History 
  White Males   Non-White Males 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
1-6k 1.16% 0.82% 1.70% 1.19% 
 
1.07% 0.75% 1.57% 1.57% 
6k-12k 4.05% 2.88% 5.77% 4.14% 
 
3.74% 2.66% 5.35% 5.35% 
12k-18k 3.12% 2.27% 4.30% 3.19% 
 
2.90% 2.11% 4.02% 4.02% 
18k-24k 3.94% 2.93% 5.26% 4.02% 
 
3.68% 2.73% 4.96% 4.96% 
24k-31k 4.98% 3.81% 6.40% 5.07% 
 
4.69% 3.57% 6.08% 6.08% 
31-38k 10.58% 8.51% 12.72% 10.73% 
 
10.10% 8.05% 12.28% 12.28% 
38k-46k 7.71% 6.59% 8.59% 7.78% 
 
7.47% 6.31% 8.44% 8.44% 
46k-60k 23.70% 22.58% 23.36% 23.73% 
 
23.56% 22.14% 23.57% 23.57% 
60k-80k 20.25% 22.66% 16.97% 20.06% 
 
20.89% 23.06% 17.71% 17.71% 
80k+ 20.50% 26.96% 14.94% 20.09% 
 
21.88% 28.62% 16.02% 16.02% 
  White Females   Non-White Females 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
1-6k 2.65% 1.87% 3.84% 2.71% 
 
2.44% 1.72% 5.25% 2.50% 
6k-12k 8.63% 6.29% 11.88% 8.82% 
 
8.03% 5.83% -0.07% 8.21% 
12k-18k 6.09% 4.64% 7.85% 6.20% 
 
5.73% 4.35% 0.05% 5.84% 
18k-24k 7.07% 5.62% 8.61% 7.17% 
 
6.73% 5.31% 0.06% 6.83% 
24k-31k 8.09% 6.76% 9.25% 8.18% 
 
7.80% 6.45% 0.33% 7.89% 
31-38k 14.62% 13.19% 15.26% 14.69% 
 
14.35% 12.78% -0.21% 14.43% 
38k-46k 8.91% 8.73% 8.49% 8.90% 
 
8.92% 8.61% 0.80% 8.92% 
46k-60k 21.03% 23.02% 17.97% 20.85% 
 
21.58% 23.32% -0.36% 21.42% 
60k-80k 12.90% 16.10% 9.79% 12.68% 
 
13.62% 16.85% -0.11% 13.40% 
80k+ 10.03% 13.77% 7.06% 9.81%   10.81% 14.78% 94.28% 10.57% 
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Appendix I 
Income Probabilities for MBAs by Gender, Race and Employment Gap History 
  White Males   Non-White Males 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
1-6k 0.08% 0.05% 0.11% 0.11% 
 
0.07% 0.05% 0.10% 0.07% 
6k-12k 0.28% 0.19% 0.41% 0.41% 
 
0.26% 0.18% 0.38% 0.26% 
12k-18k 0.23% 0.16% 0.34% 0.34% 
 
0.21% 0.15% 0.31% 0.22% 
18k-24k 0.31% 0.22% 0.46% 0.46% 
 
0.29% 0.20% 0.42% 0.29% 
24k-31k 0.43% 0.31% 0.63% 0.63% 
 
0.40% 0.28% 0.58% 0.41% 
31-38k 1.10% 0.78% 1.59% 1.59% 
 
1.02% 0.72% 1.47% 1.04% 
38k-46k 1.01% 0.72% 1.44% 1.44% 
 
0.93% 0.66% 1.34% 0.96% 
46k-60k 5.16% 3.74% 7.16% 7.16% 
 
4.79% 3.46% 6.68% 4.90% 
60k-80k 11.47% 8.75% 14.79% 14.79% 
 
10.80% 8.19% 14.05% 11.00% 
80k+ 79.93% 85.08% 73.07% 73.07% 
 
81.23% 86.10% 74.67% 80.84% 
  White Females   Non-White Females 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
No Gap Gap 
 
Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46   Age 28 Age 46 Age 28 Age 46 
1-6k 0.18% 0.12% 0.26% 0.18% 
 
0.16% 0.11% 0.34% 0.17% 
6k-12k 0.64% 0.45% 0.94% 0.66% 
 
0.59% 0.41% 0.00% 0.60% 
12k-18k 0.53% 0.37% 0.76% 0.54% 
 
0.48% 0.34% 0.00% 0.50% 
18k-24k 0.71% 0.50% 1.02% 0.73% 
 
0.65% 0.46% 0.00% 0.67% 
24k-31k 0.98% 0.69% 1.40% 1.00% 
 
0.90% 0.64% 0.00% 0.92% 
31-38k 2.43% 1.74% 3.43% 2.49% 
 
2.25% 1.61% 0.00% 2.31% 
38k-46k 2.17% 1.58% 3.00% 2.21% 
 
2.02% 1.46% 0.02% 2.06% 
46k-60k 10.25% 7.74% 13.40% 10.44% 
 
9.63% 7.23% 0.03% 9.81% 
60k-80k 18.86% 15.66% 21.80% 19.07% 
 
18.14% 14.91% 0.31% 18.36% 
80k+ 63.27% 71.15% 53.99% 62.69%   65.18% 72.82% 99.30% 64.60% 
 
 
